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LCIA’S NEW RULES: MODERNIZATION THROUGH ADHERENCE TO TRADITIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION
By
Shohin Hodizoda-Vance*
I. INTRODUCTION
"This Chamber is to have all the virtues which the law lacks. It is to be
expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where the law is
technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.”1
The foregoing was used to describe the London Court of International Arbitration
(“LCIA”) upon its formation in 1892.2 In an attempt to adhere to this description, the
LCIA released a new set of rules on July 29, 2014, which took effect on October 1,
2014.3 The new rules are the first major change since 1998 and reflect the LCIA’s
attempt to effectively respond to recent developments in the field of arbitration.4 The
updated rules include a mechanism for emergency arbitration,5 a new code of conduct for
parties and their representatives,6 provisions addressing multi-party disputes,7 as well as a
number of procedural changes that are designed to streamline and simplify the process.8
These changes come on the heels of new rules passed by other arbitral bodies, and
indicate the LCIA’s desire to remain competitive and current in relation to other
international arbitral institutions.
This article will examine the substantive changes to the LCIA’s rules, and analyze
their effect on parties seeking an arbitral forum. First, Part II examines the new provision
for Emergency Arbitration. Then, after comparing this new provision to similar
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1

History of the LCIA, LCIA ARBITRATION AND ADR WORLDWIDE, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
2

Id.

3

London International Court of Arbitration Formally Adopts New Rules, 29-8 MEALEY’S INTL. ARB. REP.
14 (2014).
4

See Kate Beioley, The LCIA: New rules and new frontiers, T HE L AWYER , March 19, 2014 (discussing
LCIA’s passage of new rule and describing the new rules as an “evolution not revolution”).
5

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 9B (2014) [hereinafter
“New LCIA Rules”].
6

Id. art. 18, Annex.

7

Id. art. 22.1.

8

See, e.g., id. arts. 2.1, 4.1, 5.6, 10.3, 15, 18.3, 28.4.
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provisions in other arbitral institutions, explains what the changes mean. Part III
examines the new Code of Conduct that legal representatives appearing before the LCIA
are required to follow. Part IV examines the new provisions in the LCIA rules addressing
multi-party disputes. Part V discusses some of the procedural changes that are designed
to discourage dilatory tactics and encourage efficient conduct by the parties and the
arbitrator.
II.  PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY ARBITRATION AND INTERIM MEASURES
A.  Emergency Arbitration: Context, History, and the LCIA’s response
Because of its efficiency and flexibility, arbitration has become one of the most
popular methods of solving international commercial disputes.9 Lower costs, neutrality
of the forum, and enforceability of the award are just a few advantages to arbitration.10
Despite its popularity and practicality, a major shortcoming of arbitration has been the
lack of an emergency arbitration mechanism in most international arbitral bodies.11
Recognizing this weakness, in the past few years several major arbitral institutions have
implemented new rules to address this issue.12 In an apparent attempt to remain
competitive in the international arbitration arena,13 the LCIA’s new rules include an
emergency arbitration provision.14
Although the LCIA’s 1998 rules included an article addressing expedited
formation of a tribunal, the provision was sparse on detail and lacked gravitas.15 Article
9 of the 1998 LCIA Rules simply stated that a party may apply for an expedited
formation of the Arbitration Tribunal in cases of “exceptional emergency,” and that “in
9

Erin Collins, Student Article, Pre-Tribunal Emergency Relief in International Commercial Arbitration, 10
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 105 (2012).
10

Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International Arbitration Rules and
Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 A M . R EV . INT ’L A RB . 317, 320 (2009).
11

Collins, supra note 9, at 116 (pointing to emergency relief as one of the few areas where “use of the
traditional system could be more efficient and is more likely to produce the desired results.”).
12

Id. Some of the institutions that have addressed the issue are: The American Arbitration Association’s
International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), The Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC), The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the International Chamber of Commerce
International Court of Arbitration (ICC). Id. (noting the recent rule changes in various arbitral institutions).
13

Beioley, supra note 4.

14

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 9B.

15

LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 9 (1998) [hereinafter
“1998 LCIA Rules”]; See also Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 10, at 362 (discussing lack of specificity in
the expedited formation of a tribunal) and 324 (highlighting the problems inherent in broad language
providing wide discretion for the formation of arbitral tribunals).
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its complete discretion,” the LCIA court may abridge certain time limits.16 The provision
did not include a timeline for the formation of a tribunal, and did little to convey a sense
of urgency.17 Moreover, Article 9 can hardly be classified as a true emergency arbitration
provision, as it only expeditiously formed the tribunal, rather than provided a mechanism
for emergency relief.18 Indeed, minimal use of the procedure is likely attributable to its
perceived lack of urgency.19
Without displacing the 1998 rule providing for the expedited formation of a
tribunal, the new rules included an article providing for emergency arbitration.20 Article
9B allows either party to an arbitration proceeding to apply for the appointment of a sole
emergency arbitrator prior to the formation of the tribunal.21 Under this provision, a
party may apply for the appointment of a sole emergency arbitrator, even if it applied for
expedited formation of a tribunal.22 The emergency arbitrator must be appointed within
three days of the receipt of application,23 and must award relief within fourteen days of
the appointment.24 Following the appointment, the arbitrator may conduct the proceeding
in any manner the arbitrator deems appropriate under the circumstances, and if necessary,
may award emergency relief without a hearing.25 Although the Emergency Arbitrator’s
award is binding on the parties and has the same force as any award made by a full

16

1998 LCIA Rules, supra note 15, art. 9.

17

See id.

18

Id.; see also Collins, supra note 9, at 110 (noting that although the rules provides some relief for parties
seeking emergency relief, they do not provide for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator); see also
Jason Fry, The Emergency Arbitrator – Flawed Fashion or Sensible Solution?, 7 Disp. Resol. Int'l 179,
182-183 (2013) (differentiating expedited formation of tribunal from emergency arbitration).
19

Robert Blackett, United States: Can Your Emergency Wait 17 Days?, M ONDAQ B USINESSS B RIEFING ,
Oct.
11,
2014,
available
at,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/346136/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Can+Your+Emergency+
Wait+17+Days. In 2012, it was reported that since the enactment of Article 9 in 1998, there had been 95
applications for expedited formation in a 14 year span. For an institution that handles about 300 cases a
year, 95 applications represents a very small segment of the LCIA’s total caseload.
20

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 9B.

21

Id. art. 9.4

22

Id.

23

Id. art. 9.6

24

Id. art. 9.8

25

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 9.7
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arbitral tribunal,26 it is subject to modification or discharge by an Arbitral Tribunal upon
the application of any party.27
Emergency or expedited arbitration may become necessary in a number of
situations. Parties who apply for emergency arbitration are often seeking an injunction,
or some type of conservancy measure to protect their interests or property.28 Emergency
relief can also be necessary to ensure that a party does not deplete its funds, making it
unable to pay an award if so ordered by an arbitral tribunal.29 Prompt action is often
needed in order to prevent a party from pursuing a course of action, which may result in
irreparable harm to another party.30
B. Analysis of the LCIA’s Emergency Arbitration Provisions
Although the LCIA’s emergency arbitration provision is comparable to similar
provisions enacted by other international arbitral institutions, there are some
distinctions.31 For instance, the timeline for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator
is slightly shorter in several of the other institutions.32 Similarly, these institutions afford
the emergency arbitrators less latitude, and promulgate stricter rules governing the
conduct of the proceeding and rendition of awards.33 Unlike the LCIA, several
institutions also require the emergency arbitrator to set a schedule and hold a formal
hearing before rendering a decision.34
Despite these differences however, there are several similarities. Similar to the
LCIA, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”) and the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) provide for both expedited arbitration and emergency
26

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 9.9

27

Id. art. 9.11

28

See Fry, supra note 18, at 2.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

See generally Collins, supra note 9 (comparing and contrasting emergency and interim provisions of
arbitral institutions).
32

See id. at 110-115 The ICDR, the SIAC, and the SCC require appointment within a day, and the ICC
requires appointment within two days.
33

See id. The SCC and the ICC, for instance, have detailed rules that require the parties to submit specific
information relating to the reason for the emergency application and the proposed conduct of the
emergency application.
34

See id. The ICDR, SIAC, and ICC, for example, require the Emergency Arbitrator to propose a schedule
for the emergency proceedings. Furthermore, the SIAC requires the emergency arbitrator to hold a hearing
before rendering an award.
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arbitration.35 The International Centre for dispute resolution (“ICDR”), the SIAC, the
SCC, and the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) also provide a mechanism for
vacatur or modification of an award by the arbitral tribunal once it is formed.36
Significantly, similar to the LCIA rules, other international institutions, such as
the SCC, ICDR and the ICC, have also made it clear that the emergency provision is not
intended to prevent a party from seeking urgent measures from a judicial authority.37
This is a key feature of any emergency arbitration provision because it exhibits an
understanding that despite the advantages of arbitration, it is not a panacea, and resorting
to the courts may sometimes be necessary to receive effective emergency relief.38
Because arbitrators generally lack coercive powers and lack authority over third parties,
courts may be a more desirable avenue for obtaining such relief. 39
Furthermore, the LCIA’s emergency arbitration provision holds a key advantage
over the ICC’s analogous provision. Whereas an ICC emergency arbitrator’s decision
takes the form of an “order,” an LCIA emergency arbitrator’s decision is an “award.”40
This is an important distinction because under the New York Convention, which is the
mechanism for the enforcement of awards, only “awards” are enforceable.41 Therefore,
presuming that the parties do not choose to have the award reviewed by the a full Arbitral
Tribunal, the LCIA’s emergency arbitration should avoid any enforcement issues.
Notwithstanding the slight variations between the LCIA’s emergency arbitration
provision and that of other arbitral institutions, the rule change has likely filled a chasm
that could have served as a detractor for parties seeking the appropriate forum to
adjudicate a dispute. Although the broad discretionary power granted to the Emergency
Arbitrator to conduct the proceeding in any way the arbitrator deems appropriate may be
seen as an unwelcome expansion of arbitral authority, the broad language provides
arbitrators with flexibility to render an award quickly and effectively, which is often the
intent of parties seeking emergency relief.

35

See Collins, supra note 9, at 117-118.

36

See id., at 110-115.

37

Id., at 119-120.

38

Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 10, at 322.

39

Id. citing Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 A M .
R EV . INT ’L A RB . 335, 371-72 (2008) (pointing to the advantages of resorting to a national court, including a
court’s authority over non-parties to the arbitration); see also Collins, supra note 9, at 120.
40

Blackett, supra note 19.

41

Id.
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III.  

CODE OF CONDUCT GOVERNING PARTIES AND THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
A.  Development of Ethical Standards in Arbitration

As arbitration has grown in popularity, a major point of discussion in the arbitral
community has centered on the necessity and viability of an ethical code of conduct for
parties in arbitration, as well as their legal representatives.42 At its inception, the arbitral
community was small and self-contained, thus diminishing the need for a formal code of
ethics.43 The profession was self-regulated and “informal peer pressure” from colleagues
was an effective method for discouraging unethical behavior.44 The practice is illustrated
by the widespread use of, and adherence to, lex mercatoria, an unwritten law of
merchants which emphasized fairness and good faith.45 However, as arbitration has
grown in popularity, so have the number of legal professionals involved in arbitration,
rendering self-regulation and peer pressure an ineffective method of enforcing ethical
standards.46 Furthermore, as the inclusion of choice-of-law provisions in arbitration
clauses has become more common, arbitration lawyers no longer feel bound by the
ethical standards of lex mercatoria.47
Because of these changes in the practice of international arbitration, many experts
in the field have advocated for the enactment of stricter and more uniform codes of
ethics.48 However, international arbitration poses a unique challenge for the development
of a code of ethics.49 When regulating cross-border legal practice, the problem generally
centers on whether the ethical standards of the attorney’s home state, or the ethical
standards of the host state govern.50 Therefore, although there is uncertainty regarding
42

See generally Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 M ICH J. INT ’L L. 341 (2002) [hereinafter Rogers, Developing a Code of
Conduct for International Arbitration] (discussing the need for ethical guidelines in arbitration); see also
Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an
Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 S TAN J. INT ’L L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Rogers,
Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration].
43

Rogers, Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 351-54.

44

Id., at 344.

45

Id., at 351.

46

Id., at 354-55.

47

Id., at 354.

48

See Rogers, Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at
354(highlighting the need for a predictable and uniform means of regulating attorneys).
49

Id.

50

Id., at 355-56.
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which ethical standard applies, the existence of some type of standard is not in question
in non-arbitral international proceedings.51 However, because international arbitral
bodies are disassociated from any state, the problem is not regulatory competition, but
rather a lack of regulation.52
One possible solution to filling this chasm is including a choice of law provision
in the arbitral agreement, identifying a specific ethical code that is to govern the
proceedings.53 Because many arbitral agreements specify the substantive national law
that is to govern the dispute, incorporating a provision specifying an ethical standard
appears to be a reasonable extension of the parties’ power to choose the governing law.54
Although this approach pays a great deal of deference to the concepts of party autonomy
and freedom of contract, it presents a number of practical obstacles, the most significant
of which is that national ethical guidelines were not written with arbitral proceedings in
mind, thus, making them a poor substitute for ethical guidelines written specifically for
arbitration.55 Furthermore, because many arbitral clauses are inserted into much larger
contracts without proper attention to detail, the drafter is unlikely to specify ethical
standards, and is even less likely to provide for a mechanism to resolve a potential void in
the chosen guidelines.56
In 2004, the International Bar Association (“IBA”) made the first widespread and
concerted effort to recommend a uniform code of ethics in international arbitration.57
Although the IBA Guidelines are well-reasoned and address many of the ethical
challenges that exist in international arbitration, they only set forth ethical standards for
arbitrators, not the legal representatives of parties.58 Moreover, the guidelines are not
binding on any arbitral body and serve merely as an advisory set of rules.59 A survey of
arbitral decisions from 2004 to 2009 found that the number of judgments that reference

51

Rogers, Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 355-56.

52

Id., at 356-57.

53

Id., at 402.

54

Id., at 402-03.

55

Id., at 404.

56

Rogers, Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 403 – 05.

57

The IBA Conflicts of Interest Subcommittee, a Subcommittee of the IBA Arbitration Committee, The
IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration: The First Five Years 2004-2009; 4 DRI
5 (2009).
58

Id.

59

Id.
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the guidelines was sparse.60 In an attempt to enact ethical standards that are binding
rather than advisory, the LCIA added provisions governing ethics, making it the first
major institution to enact such a code.61
B. LCIA’s Rules Governing Ethics
The LCIA’s rules governing ethics are contained in a newly-added Annex and are
made binding upon the parties by Article 18.62 Paragraph one of the Annex lays out the
general contours of the guidelines, stating that the rules are designed to encourage proper
conduct among the parties.63 It also limits the reach of the rule by explaining that a legal
representative’s duty of loyalty to his or her client remains the primary consideration.64
Furthermore, paragraph one makes it clear that the general guidelines of the Annex are
pre-empted by “any mandatory laws, rules of law, professional rules or codes of conduct
if and to the extent that any are shown to apply to a legal representative appearing in the
arbitration.”65 This provision seemingly refers to mandatory ethical guidelines to which
practitioners are bound in their home state, or the rules of the host state, violations of
which can lead to disciplinary action in the same.
Paragraph two prohibits a legal representative from engaging in obstructive or
dilatory tactics in bad faith.66 Paragraph three prohibits a legal representative from
knowingly making false statements,67 and paragraph four and five prohibit a legal
representative from presenting false evidence,68 or concealing evidence which is ordered
to be produced by the Tribunal.69 Paragraph six prohibits a legal representative from
60

The IBA Conflicts of Interest Subcommittee, a Subcommittee of the IBA Arbitration Committee, supra
note 58, at 6-7 (citing to a 2006 survey found three court cases that referred to the IBA Guidelines). The
article also notes, however, that since 2006, there has been a steady increase in the number of references to
these guidelines.
61

Vasilis Pappas & George M. Vlavianos, Canada: New LCIA Arbitration Rules Come Into Effect on
October
1,
2014,
M ONDAQ
B USINESSS B RIEFING ,
Oct.
11,
2014,
available
at,
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/346056/International+Courts+Tribunals/New+LCIA+Arbitration+Rules
+Come+into+Effect+on+October+1+2014.
62

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 18, Annex.

63

Id., Annex ¶ 1.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id., Annex ¶ 2.

67

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 18, Annex ¶ 3.

68

Id., Annex ¶ 4.

69

Id., Annex ¶ 5.
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contacting any member of the Arbitral Tribunal or the LCIA court without making a
written disclosure to all parties and all members of the Arbitral Tribunal.70
Article 18 sets forth the process for determining whether a party has violated the
guidelines and what sanctions the tribunal may impose on a violator.71 If a party files a
complaint against another party’s legal representative, the Arbitral Tribunal must grant
the legal representative a “reasonable opportunity to answer the complaint” before
rendering a judgment.72 If the Tribunal determines that a legal representative has violated
the guidelines, it may issue a written reprimand, a written caution, or “any other measure
necessary to fulfil with the arbitration the general duties required of the Arbitral
Tribunal[.]”73 Although the rule seems to give the tribunal a great deal of latitude in
dealing with unethical behavior, the extent of a tribunal’s willingness (or ability, for that
matter) to impose a harsh punishment is unclear. Also of interest is the fact that Article
18 places a certain degree of responsibility on the parties involved in the arbitration, by
requiring that they ensure that their respective legal representatives have agreed to
comply with the guidelines.74 However, the article does not mention any type of sanction
or punishment for failing to ensure that a legal representative has agreed to comply with
the ethical guidelines.75
The guidelines are a positive first step toward addressing the ethical problems
facing international arbitration. The strength of the guidelines is that they do not attempt
to overregulate.76 Understanding that their reach can often be longer than their grasp, the
new rules do not promulgate regulations that the tribunal is powerless to enforce. The
Annex concedes, for instance, that if a conflict arises between mandatory ethical
standards to which an attorney is bound, and the LCIA’s guidelines, the latter may not
apply.77 This is an important concession because it appears to demonstrate that the
drafters understood the inherent limitations of an international arbitral body, and that any
attempt by that international body to impose guidelines, which could require legal

70

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 18, Annex ¶ 6.

71

Id., art. 18.6.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id., art. 18.5.

75

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 18.5.

76

See generally e.g. Rogers, Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, supra note
42 (noting that while it is important for arbitral institutions to develop and promulgate ethical standards, a
legal representative’s home state retains an interest in regulating an attorney that must be recognized; also
noting that a sanctions for a violation of any ethical provision may not necessarily be enforceable under the
New York Convention).
77

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, Annex ¶ 1.
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representatives to violate their home country’s ethical standards, would be greeted with
disdain from practitioners.78
IV.  

MULTIPARTY DISPUTES
A.  Consolidation of Arbitral Disputes

Due to its popularity as a dispute resolution mechanism, arbitral proceedings are
becoming increasingly complex and may include numerous parties or several parallel
proceedings.79 The question of if, and when, an arbitral body should allow for, or require
consolidation has become a hotly contested issue.80 The threshold question posed by
commentators is whether a tribunal should ever have the power to consolidate
proceedings.81 Assuming that the answer is in the affirmative, the question becomes
whether a tribunal should require consent from all parties before ordering consolidation,
or whether the tribunal should be allowed to consolidate proceedings without consent in
the interest of maintaining procedural efficiency.82 The answer to the latter question is
deceptively elusive and raises both doctrinal and procedural issues.83
From a doctrinal perspective, party autonomy has been a key feature of the
Anglo-American legal system, especially in arbitration.84 Indeed, arbitration is based on
the idea of freedom of contract, which stems from party autonomy.85 Compelling
78

Rogers, Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 21-23.

79

S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of
Individual Contract Right or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 V AND . J. T RASNAT’L L. 915, 917-920
(1998).
80

See Okuma Kazutake, Party Autonomy In International Commercial Arbitration: Consolidation of
Multiparty and Classwide Arbitration, 9 A NN . S URV . INT ’L & C OMP. L. 189 (2003) ; see also Thomas J.
Stepanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. R EV .
473, 492-493 (1987) (identifying the ancillary issue of joinders and impleaders, which involves compelling
a third party to join in the arbitral proceeding). Because these procedures involve compelling the
appearance of a non-signatory party before a tribunal, they should be used sparingly and with particular
discretion. Therefore, these mechanisms are not a widely accepted ways of dealing with multi-party
disputes.
81

Kazutake, supra note 80, at 191.

82

Id.

83

See Kazutake, supra note 80 (highlighting the divergent views on the appropriateness of arbitration); see
also Stepnaowich, supra note 80 (same).
84

See generally Stepanowich, supra note 80, at 495, 525; see also Rogers, Constructing an Enforcement
Regime for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 14.
85

Id.
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consolidation of arbitral proceedings would seemingly violate that autonomy.86 From a
procedural perspective, the mechanism for achieving consolidation can also be
problematic.87 The coercive power of a tribunal is generally limited and an order
consolidating proceedings may be difficult to enforce.88 Therefore, effectuating
enforcement may require intervention from the court system.89
In turn, resorting to the courts raises a different set of concerns.90 Not only can
intervention by the courts be seen as “an impermissible intrusion into the domain of an
[arbitral tribunal,]” but allowing such intrusion may defeat the purpose of arbitration.91
Parties arbitrate disputes because they see it as a more efficient and cost-effective way of
settling disputes than going through the judicial system.92 Allowing a party to seek
judicial intervention would seemingly detract from arbitration’s strength.93
Despite these concerns, many jurisdictions have allowed for some type of
consolidation of proceedings.94 In the United States, for instance, most courts have
prohibited consolidation of arbitral proceedings unless the parties agree.95 Similarly, the
French courts have been reluctant to allow for consolidation in the absence of a clear
intent to do so.96 The British courts have taken a more liberal approach, allowing for
86

See generally Stepanowich, supra note 80, at 495, 525; see also Rogers, Constructing an Enforcement
Regime for International Arbitration, supra note 42, at 14.
87

See Stepanowich, supra note 80, at 509-510.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id., at 494.

91

Id., at 494-495, 509 n.199 (citing Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc.,
349 So. 2d 491 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that excessive judicial intervention impedes the purpose of
arbitration)).

92

See, e.g., Stepanowich, supra note 80, at 474 (“The move toward arbitration has been stimulated by the
perception that arbitration affords disputants a means of resolving disagreements more quickly and less
expensively than litigation.”).
93

See id., at 494-495.

94

See generally Kazutake, supra note 80 (examining how the courts in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France have allowed for consolidation).
95

Id., at 192-194. The notable exception to the general rule prohibiting consolidation without parties’
consent is the Second Circuit, which held in Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S. A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.
A., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975) that consolidation of arbitral proceedings without the express agreement of
the parties involved was proper, because although no explicit provision for consolidation of proceedings
between the parties was present, there were references to consolidation of proceedings in the respective
agreements.
96

See id. at 196-197.
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consolidation of the proceedings despite the absence of an express agreement to do so.97
In concluding that the proceedings may be consolidated, the court in Erith Contractors
Ltd v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd. considered the background of the dispute and the
intent of the parties.98 The survey of these jurisdictions makes it clear that although there
are nuanced differences in approach, jurisdictions have recognized the need to implement
some type of mechanism for consolidating disputes.99
B. The LCIA Rules Governing Multi-Party Disputes
The LCIA addresses consolidation of disputes in Articles 22.1(ix) and 22.1(x).100
Article 22.1(ix) allows the LCIA Court to consolidate two or more arbitral proceedings if
all the parties to the arbitration agree in writing.101 This provision is not very
controversial, as it requires written consent from all the parties before compelling
consolidation. However, Article 22.1(x) is slightly more contentious, as it may allow for
consolidation of proceedings without the consent of the parties.102 Under this latter
provision, the LCIA Court may order consolidation if a tribunal has not yet been formed
for the other arbitration(s) – irrespective of whether the parties consent.103 Although the
Article is not explicit in when consolidation is appropriate, tribunals generally
consolidate cases when there is a common agreement, or when the dispute arises from a
common set of facts.104 Also of note is that the new rules now recognize the concept of
cross-claims,105 which the old rules made no mention of.106 In cases which involve more
97

See Kazutake, supra note 80 at 198.

98

See id. (citing Erith Contractors Ltd v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd., [1994] ADR LJ 123 Official
Referees His Honour Judge John Loyd Q.C., unreported; White & Case, 7 Int'l Arbitration Newsletter 1, 11
(Jan.1994)
99

See Kazutake, supra note 80, at 213.

100

New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 22.1 (ix), 22.1 (x).

101

Id., art. 22.1 (ix) (“to order, with the approval of the LCIA Court, the consolidation of the arbitration
with one or more other arbitrations into a single arbitration subject to the LCIA Rules where all the parties
to the arbitrations to be consolidated so agree in writing”).

102

Id., art. 22.1 (x) (“to order, with the approval of the LCIA Court, the consolidation of the arbitration
with one or more other arbitrations subject to the LCIA Rules commenced under the same arbitration
agreement or any compatible arbitration agreement(s) between the same disputing parties, provided that no
arbitral tribunal has yet been formed by the LCIA Court for such other arbitration(s) or, if already formed,
that such tribunal(s) is(are) composed of the same arbitrators…”).
103

Id.

104

See Stepanowich, supra note 80, at 505 (“…consolidation is considered appropriate only in cases
involving common issues and facts arising out of related transactions…”).
105

See, e.g., New LCIA Rules, supra note 5, art. 15.3, 15.4, 15.5.
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than one Respondent, a Respondent may assert a claim against another Respondent by
way of a cross-claim.107 The availability of this procedure is crucial in disputes involving
multiple Respondents, because it allows all claims to be decided under a single
proceeding.
The LCIA’s rules are comparable to those of other international arbitral
institutions, but with slight variations. For example, the ICC grants its tribunal more
latitude in deciding when to consolidate arbitrations.108 In addition to situations where
both parties consent, the ICC allows consolidation when “the claims in the arbitrations
are made under more than one arbitration agreement, the arbitrations are between the
same parties, the disputes in the arbitrations arise in connection with the same legal
relationship, and the Court finds the arbitration agreements to be compatible.”109 This
grants significantly more power to the ICC Court/Tribunal than the LCIA’s rules.
Similarly, the SCC grants the Board the power to order consolidation upon the request of
any of the parties.110 Although it requires the Board to consult with the parties and the
tribunal, it does not place any procedural limitations on when the SCC may order
consolidation.111
The LCIA’s rule changes should ensure that it remains competitive in relation to
other international arbitral institutions. Although the new rules limit the situations in
which proceedings may be consolidated, this constraint may not necessarily affect the
LCIA adversely. Parties often do not wish to grant arbitrators sweeping powers to
consolidate. Furthermore, practitioners are likely to respond positively to a provision
requiring consent to consolidate once tribunals have been formed for all disputes in
question.
V.  PROCEDURAL RULE CHANGES
A.  Improved Efficiency of the Arbitral Process
As mentioned previously, arbitration has become an increasingly popular way of
settling international commercial disputes, in large part because of the perception that it is
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more efficient and cost-effective than the judicial system.112 To ensure that the growth in
popularity is sustained, it is imperative that arbitral institutions continue to improve the
process and make it more efficient. The new LCIA rules attempt to do that.
1.   Encouraging efficient conduct by the parties
There are numerous procedural changes that encourage efficiency and modernity.
Parties now may deliver communication to the LCIA electronically rather than in person
or by mail.113 The time that a party has to file a response has also been shortened from 30
days to 28.114 If a party wishes to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator, they must
do so within 14 days of the formation of the Tribunal, or within 14 days of becoming
aware of the existence of grounds for a challenge.115 However, the time for constituting a
tribunal has been increased from 30 days to 35 days.116 A claimant also now has the
ability to have the Request for Arbitration serve as the Statement of the Case,117 and the
respondent may elect to have the Response serve as the Statement of Defense, thereby
eliminating the need for unnecessary and duplicative filings.118 Other possible
disruptions are also addressed in the new rules. For example, any controversy regarding
the sufficiency of a Request or Response will not delay the formation of a Tribunal.119
Similarly, the court may proceed with the formation of a tribunal, even if a “Request is
incomplete, or the Response is missing, late or incomplete.”120
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2.   Discouraging Dilatory Tactics
A party’s attempt to make changes to its legal representation as a dilatory tactic is
also addressed in Article 18 of the new rules.121 If a party intends to make any changes
or additions to its legal representation, it must first inform all other parties, the Tribunal
and the LCIA Registrar.122 The Tribunal, in turn, must approve the change, and may
withhold such approval if it determines that “the change could compromise the
composition of the [] Tribunal or the finality of any award[.]”123 Furthermore, the
tribunal is expressly permitted to consider the parties’ conduct when awarding costs.124
Specifically, the tribunal may account for a party’s lack of cooperation which may have
led to undue delay or the incursion of unnecessary costs.125
3.   Encouraging efficient conduct by the Arbitrators
In addition to encouraging efficient conduct by the parties, the new rules also
encourage the Tribunal to act more efficiently. An amendment to Article 5 requires
arbitral candidates to provide the Registrar with a written declaration that they are “ready,
willing and able to devote sufficient time, diligence and industry to ensure the
expeditious conduct of the arbitration.”126 Article 15 has also been amended to require
the arbitrators to make a final award “as soon as reasonably possible.”127
The new rules governing arbitrators’ conduct seem to be designed to provide an
effective response to the growing concern that despite its many advantages, arbitration
has become an extremely prolonged process riddled with delay.128 Some commentators
have argued that incorporating final award deadlines into every procedure is the most
effective response to this growing concern.129 Under this system, once the arbitral
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proceeding has commenced, the parties and the arbitrators must agree on a deadline for
when a final award is made.130 The IBA has also proposed a solution to the issue, albeit a
much less rigid solution.131 Its rules require an arbitrator to devote the reasonable time
and effort that the parties are “entitled to expect,” and that they conduct the proceedings
with reasonable haste.132 The language and reach of the LCIA’s new rules closely
resembles that of the IBA. Although the new rules do not require a firm deadline, , the
cumulative effect of the new provisions should be to further discourage unnecessary
delays that may result from an arbitrator’s inaction.
B. Improving Contact between the parties and the Tribunal
In an attempt to encourage cooperation and the speedy resolution of disputes, the
new LCIA rules also have provisions requiring parties to communicate with each
other.133 The parties and the Tribunal are now required to make contact with each other
within 21 days of the formation of the Tribunal.134 The parties are also encouraged to
“agree on a joint proposal for the conduct of their arbitration” with the input of the
Tribunal.135 Furthermore, the new rules require the parties to communicate directly with
the Tribunal once it is formed, eliminating the Registrar as an intercessor.136 The
previous version required all communication between the parties and the arbitrators to be
made through the Registrar prior to the formation of the Tribunal, but made no mention
of the manner of communication after the formation of the Tribunal.137 These new
provisions should improve communication not only between the parties, but also between
the parties and the tribunal, thus making the arbitral process more efficient.
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C. Expansion of the Express Powers of the Tribunal
The new rules expand the power of the Tribunal by removing the ability of the
parties to limit the Additional Powers granted to a Tribunal by Article 22.138 This
provision grants the Arbitral Tribunal a wide range of powers.139 These powers include:
the power to allow a party to supplement, modify or amend any documents;140 the power
to adjust time periods;141 the power to conduct its own investigations;142 and the power to
request production of documents, including the power to compel a third party to produce
documents.143 Although the previous version of this rule allowed the parties to opt out of
this provision, the new rule grants the Tribunal the Additional Powers regardless of any
written agreement by the parties to the contrary.144 Similarly, the parties can no longer
curtail a tribunal’s right to grant interim or conservancy measures.145
The change to the Additional Powers raises an interesting and oft-debated
question regarding the balance between freedom of contract, and the need to promote
efficiency. Freedom of contract, which allows the parties to fashion an arbitration
agreement in a manner that best suits their needs, is one of the basic tenets of
arbitration.146 Traditionally, parties have been allowed to fashion an arbitration
agreement in such a way that would allow them to dictate the limits of an arbitrator or an
arbitral tribunal.147 Abolishing the right of a party to opt out of a provision may be seen
by some as an attack on the parties’ freedom of contract.148 However, stripping an
arbitrator of all power can make the arbitral process inefficient and slow, thus defeating
one of the main objectives of arbitration – efficiency. The change is therefore likely to be
received as a welcome rebalancing of power between the arbitrators and the parties.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The LCIA’s new rules attempt to address some of the biggest problems facing
arbitration tribunals. By enacting provisions to address emergency arbitration and multiparty disputes, the drafters have demonstrated their commitment to ensuring that the
LCIA is able to provide effective adjudication to an increasing number of complex
disputes that require procedural flexibility. Meanwhile, the LCIA’s enactment of ethical
standards, basic though they are, reflects the LCIA’s desire to maintain the integrity of
the arbitral process in the institution. However, it is clear that although the LCIA was
eager to address these issues, it did not attempt to supplant the basic principles of
arbitration that have likely contributed to its success, such as party autonomy, and the
relative informality of the process.
The LCIA’s procedural changes reveal a steadfast commitment in the arbitral
community to maximize efficiency and delay unnecessary delays. Despite its
advantages, delay has become wide-spread in arbitration, and the cumulative effect of the
numerous minor changes should maintain the Chambers promise: to be expeditious
where the law is slow.149
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